Cyber Risk Assessment and Mitigation Using Logit and Probit Models for DDoS attacks by Sharma, Kalpit & Mukhopadhyay, Arunabha
Association for Information Systems 
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL) 
AMCIS 2020 Proceedings Information Security and Privacy (SIGSEC) 
Aug 10th, 12:00 AM 
Cyber Risk Assessment and Mitigation Using Logit and Probit 
Models for DDoS attacks 
Kalpit Sharma 
Indian Institute of Management Lucknow, fpm18012@iiml.ac.in 
Arunabha Mukhopadhyay 
Indian Institute of Management Lucknow, arunabha@iiml.ac.in 
Follow this and additional works at: https://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis2020 
Sharma, Kalpit and Mukhopadhyay, Arunabha, "Cyber Risk Assessment and Mitigation Using Logit and 
Probit Models for DDoS attacks" (2020). AMCIS 2020 Proceedings. 3. 
https://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis2020/info_security_privacy/info_security_privacy/3 
This material is brought to you by the Americas Conference on Information Systems (AMCIS) at AIS Electronic 
Library (AISeL). It has been accepted for inclusion in AMCIS 2020 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of 
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact elibrary@aisnet.org. 
Cyber Risk Assessment and Mitigation of DDoS attacks 
Americas Conference on Information Systems 1 
Cyber Risk Assessment and Mitigation Using 
Logit and Probit Models for DDoS attacks 
Completed Research 
Kalpit Sharma 
IIM Lucknow 
kalpit@iiml.ac.in 
Arunabha Mukhopadhyay 
IIM Lucknow 
arunabha@iiml.ac.in 
Abstract 
Hackers have been employing Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks at an unprecedented rate in 
recent times. In 2018, a 37% rise in such DDoS attacks, wherein traffic reached a peak size of 300 Gbps per 
attack was alarming. DDoS attacks hinder a business by preventing legitimate customers from accessing 
the firm’s cyber resources (e.g. website, cloud services, streaming quality, etc.). In this study, we aim to 
assess and mitigate cyber-risk by computing the probability of such DDoS attacks occurring and expected 
losses associated with them. We use logit and probit models along with standard distribution fitting 
methods to ascertain the aforesaid questions. Subsequently, we also suggest ways to mitigate cyber-risk 
resulting due to DDoS attacks by accepting, reducing or passing it. Our study aims to aid CTOs in deciding 
the best strategy to handle cyber-risk due to DDoS attacks. 
Keywords 
DDoS, Protection Motivation theory, Rational choice theory, Logit Model, Probit Model, Cyber-risk. 
Introduction 
Malicious hackers execute Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks to hinder business globally, by 
preventing legitimate users from using cyber-resources of the firm. In 2018, the financial losses due to a 
DDoS attack ranged from US$ 120K to US$ 2M, including direct and indirect losses. In 2018, DDoS attacks 
were 37% larger in size than the previous year. DDoS attacks inundate the network with data packets as 
large as 26.37 Gbps on average to overwhelm the network infrastructure (Abrams 2018). Usually, these 
attackers employ a stealthy web of botnets, which carry out the DDoS attack. Thus, it is difficult to detect 
the attacker and prevent the attacks in future. 
Industries like gaming, video streaming, banking and financial sector (BFSI) which operate on real-time 
networks suffered from losses amounting to US$ 4 million in 2015 (Sharma and Mukhopadhyay 2020a; 
Zumberge 2015). The losses have increased astronomically since. In 2019, an unnamed streaming 
application company was targeted by a DDoS attack for two weeks peaking at 292,000 requests per second, 
originating from 402,000 different IP addresses (Shani 2019). It resulted in a huge loss of about US$ 200 
million for the firm at the rate of US$ 0.5 million peak loss per hour (Bezsonoff 2017). As early as in 2016, 
the entertainment industry suffered huge losses due to infamous 2016 Dyn server attack; crippled a large 
number of big digital firms like Netflix, Spotify, Twitter, BBC, CNN, The New York Times, and other 
entertainment services like HBO Now and Elder Scrolls (Chiel 2017). 
The entertainment industry (video streaming, music streaming, gaming, etc.) have been hit by DDoS attacks 
the worst. Gamers form a lucrative high-spending niche segment who have a tight-knit network with other 
online game players. Hackers attack multiple nodes by infecting a vulnerable network of gamers and slowly 
spread the DDoS botnets to other user nodes. Many hackers tend to target popular games to get hold of 
accounts while they are being used in real-time. Hackers can hide their trail by behaving as gamers and 
exchanging their loot for in-game items or virtual currency (McKeay 2017). Firms lose approximately US$ 
50,000 per hour when under a DDoS attack (Bezsonoff 2017; Sharma and Mukhopadhyay 2020b). 
In 2014, the hacker group, Lizard Squad took down Sony's PlayStation Network and Microsoft's Xbox Live 
during Christmas week (Smith 2014). The group; claimed to be launching the attack “for laughs” but 
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continued causing damage to educate the two giants about strengthening their cyber-security. They chose 
Christmas as they wanted to harm many users owing to peak transaction volume. In 2019, 51% of the 
network DDoS attacks lasted less than 15 minutes but many attacks persistently attacked the same target 
(Avital et al. 2020).  
Thus, we intend to estimate the probability of detecting such a DDoS attack and expected loss associated 
with the same. Subsequently, we intend to map different classes and suggest ways to lower the risk as well 
as loss severity for ones with extremely high risk and severity. 
Literature Review 
Cyber risk assessment has been at the helm of cybersecurity research since the advent of Newer Information 
Technology for businesses (Gordon et al. 2003). Assessment of risk helps identify and subsequently 
quantify the probability of a cybersecurity incident occurring provided the security protocols were in place. 
The cyber risk assessment also aids in evaluating the efficacy of IT risk management compliance structure 
already in place in organizations. 
Cyber risk assessment methods intend to identify information assets (such as hardware, systems, laptops, 
customer data, and intellectual property) which can be under cyber-attack and their associated risks. 
Information assets are divided into multiple classes according to the perceived risk in order of their severity, 
and broken into sub-parts to correctly identify the risky component of the asset and its type (tangible, 
intangible, etc.) (O’Reilly et al. 2018). The risk assessment stage is followed by quantification of identified 
risk with the help of diverse methods aiming at attaching a monetary value to it. 
Cyber risk quantification methods rely on the probability of a risky incident occurring and rigorous 
estimation of loss amount for such incidents. Thus, the accuracy of such methods relies on the accuracy of 
risk identification as well as loss calculation. Loss estimation methods also evolve according to the unit of 
analysis and definition of loss for which we are undertaking the aforesaid exercise. Thus, the expected loss 
for entity resulting due to cyberattacks depends not only on the incident but also on our ability to accurately 
estimate its loss. These estimations also vary in their methodological rigor depending upon the type and 
granularity of data available to calculate them. Cyber risk quantification techniques range from 
mathematical risk modelling to data mining methods using empirical data available from security providers 
(Campbell and Stamp 2004). 
Many of the initial quantitative approaches tried to model the cyber risk scenario as an uncertainty model 
where the probability of cyber risk occurrence is to be studied. Most of these classification model use traffic 
attributes such as TCP/IP layer used for the attack, quanta of bits used and packet structure to typify cyber-
attacks’ presence or otherwise. The uncertainty of classification can be modelled using various statistical 
methods which use some prior knowledge of the occurrence of a cyber breach and update it with current 
evidence through data. Logit and probit models have been used to calculate the probability of a cyber risk 
occurring using CSI-FBI survey data from 1997-2010 (Mukhopadhyay et al. 2019). Machine learning 
techniques such as Bagger classifier and CART based hybrid classifier are efficient at assessing phishing 
attacks (Biswas and Mukhopadhyay 2017). On the other hand, augmented decision tree classifier along with 
Chi-square and Symmetric uncertainty were found to be  effective in analysing DDoS feature vectors from 
CAIDA dataset (Balkanli et al. 2015). Copula-based methods, that are quite popular with actuarial 
researchers, quantified cyber risk and thus, were used to propose insurance approaches in complex risk 
modelling situations such as cyber-attacks (Herath and Herath 2011). It has been previously shown that 
cyber risk attack vectors can be efficiently modelled using density estimation methods and thus, augment 
the accuracy of a method that relies upon distribution statistics to classify (Alhazmi et al. 2007). Fuzzy logic-
based RiMaHCoF method was able to quantify cyber-risks in overlapping and conflicting risk classes (Smith 
and Eloff 2002). 
Decision trees and their other variants like ensemble methods, hybrid classifiers are quite efficient with 
provision for decision rules for informing future decisions for classifying similar incident vectors. The use 
of only a small number of independent features constructs a very highly complex tree and pruning it 
becomes difficult given the trade-off with its accuracy (Biswas et al. 2016). Thus, a large stress is on finding 
interpretable quantitative method to ascertain probability of a cyber-attack occurring. 
Cyber Risk Assessment and Mitigation of DDoS attacks 
Americas Conference on Information Systems 3 
Theoretical Foundation 
We model our study on basis of protection responses of firms when they are motivated to do so under a fear 
appeal. Protection-motivation theory states that the magnitude of fear appeal, probability of that event 
occurring and efficacy of response are the chief descriptors of firms’ behavior under an cyber-attack (Boss 
et al. 2015; Rogers 1975). Firm also evaluate risks by weighing the costs and benefits to select the best 
outcome in such a situation. Rational-choice theory states that choice of outcome is subjective and depends 
on the preference structure of the decision maker, that is, firms in this case (Becker 1978; Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979a). The costs and benefits of the intended responses or outcomes can be constrained in terms 
of time, money or effort. Some protection responses demand to be implemented quickly otherwise their 
efficacy suffer drastically.  
Similarly, cyber-criminals also weigh in their options while executing the attack and thus, the most lucrative 
firms in terms of money and vulnerability are usually targeted. Criminals are also constrained in terms of 
effort, time and money. They must execute least possible attacks and cause more harm at the same time to 
the targets. Thus, they usually target firms with high number of vulnerabilities exposed and moderate to 
high customer base.  
Firms choose between different alternatives of hedging their cyber-risks by selecting options with least 
monetary loss and quality of service. This is in line with the prospect theory which states that firms and  
individuals works on loss aversion and carefully evaluates their risks and benefits before making real-life 
choices (Kahneman and Tversky 1979b). 
Proposed Model 
 
Figure 1: CRAM-D Research Model 
 
Figure 1 depicts the proposed Cyber-risk Assessment and Mitigation model for DDoS (CRAM-D) which 
consists of three modules namely Risk Assessment, Loss Computation and Risk Mitigation. The model takes 
attack vector features, that is, bits per second (bps) and duration of the DDoS attack and outputs possible 
risk mitigation strategies by estimating probability of attack and subsequent expected loss in intermediate 
steps. Through CRAM-D model, we intend to investigate following research questions under 
aforementioned modules. 
• RQ1: What is the probability (p) of a DDoS attack on a business organization given the intensity and 
duration of the DDoS attack?  
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• RQ2: What is the best statistical approximation of probability of an DDoS attack and loss occurring due 
to it? 
• RQ3: What is the expected loss (E(L)) from a DDoS attack on an organization? 
• RQ4: What risk mitigation strategy can CTOs choose for each type of DDoS attack? 
Data 
In this study, we have used a dataset of DDoS attacks occurring in the online gaming industry that were 
recorded by Akamai’s Prolexic software solution. The dataset consists of 10329 records from 2012 to 2018. 
Each record consists of three attack-specific variables namely bits per second (bps) received during the 
attack, packets per second (pps) received during the attack and the start and end timestamp of the attack. 
We have calculated the duration of attack as a new variable by using start and end timestamp attributes. 
We also have the types attributes that indicates the variant of DDoS attack that has occurred for that record. 
It also informs us whether the DDoS attack is a mixture of two or more attacks. The attribute bps and pps 
are highly correlated and thus, we drop pps from our final feature vector. bps attribute has been converted 
to Gigabits per second to match the scale of other variables. Duration has also been converted to hours for 
the aforesaid reason. Table 1 provides summary statistics of the aforesaid attributes. 
To pre-process our data according to our methodology, we arrange data records according to year and 
month of occurrence of that DDoS attack. Thus, for each month of the year, we have total number of DDoS 
attacks occurring and its breakdown in the six specific types of DDoS attack as mentioned in Table 2. For 
each month, we also have average intensity of attack (in Gbps) and average duration (in hours) of attacks 
of each type. These derived attributes will aid in designing a model to predict the probability of occurrence 
of each type of attack. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the dataset (N=10,329) 
Variable Count Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
pps 10329 323639 52947 0 5887744 
 bps (in Gb per second) 10329 1.62 2.66 0 27.88 
Duration (in hours) 10329 19.7 14.2 0.03 69.43 
 
Table 2: Attack Composition 
Attack Class Attack type Number of records 
A DNS Flood (DF), UDP Fragment (UFR) 3155 
B NTP Flood (NF) 2671 
C CharGEN Attack (CGA), UDP Fragment (UFR) 2030 
D SSDP Flood (SF) 1465 
E UDP Flood (UFL) 1008 
Methodology 
Risk Assessment 
In this study, we have used logit-probit models (eq 1,2) to predict the probability (p) of each type of DDoS 
attack occurring based on intensity of attack (i.e. Gbps of attack) and duration of the attack (Mukhopadhyay 
et al. 2019). We have taken the training set of attacks that occurred from 2012 to 2016 and testing set from 
2017 to 2018. The ratio of training set to testing set is roughly 80:20. 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙:            𝐸(𝑌 | 𝑋 = 𝑏𝑝𝑠, 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) = 𝑝 =  
1
1 + 𝑒−(𝛽0+𝛽1𝑏𝑝𝑠+𝛽2𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)
 (1) 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑡 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙:      𝐸(𝑌 | 𝑋 = 𝑏𝑝𝑠, 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) = 𝑝 = Φ−1(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑏𝑝𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) (2) 
Next, we try to generalize the probability of aforesaid DDoS attacks by fitting a beta distribution (eq.3) on 
the probability values thus generated for each type of attack. The aforesaid distribution fitting gives us 
central tendency measures such as mean for probability values which will be used while informing our risk 
mitigation strategies. 
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𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑝) =  
(1 − 𝑝)𝑏−1𝑝𝑎−1
𝐵(𝑎, 𝑏)
, where 𝐵(𝑎, 𝑏)is the beta function and p is the probability of attack. (3) 
Loss Computation 
In this module, we calculate total loss for each data record at the rate of US$ 0.5 million per hour (Bezsonoff 
2017; Sharma and Mukhopadhyay 2020b). We generalize the loss in each attack type as a gamma 
distribution (eq.4) and similarly, calculate mean loss amount for each type of DDoS attack. Next, we 
calculate expected loss for each attack type. 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐿) =  
𝐿𝛼−1𝑒−𝐿 𝜆⁄
Γ(𝛼)𝜆𝛼
, where  Γ(𝛼) is the gamma function and L is the loss amount for that attack type. (4) 
Risk Mitigation 
We plot the expected loss and probability of attack types on a heat matrix to tag attack types according to 
levels of criticality. If the probability of occurrence for an attack is less than 0.5 then it is low risk quadrant 
otherwise high. If the expected loss is less than US$ 1.78 million then the attack type falls in low severity 
quadrant otherwise high. The boundary values dividing the quadrants are chosen by the CTO and strategies 
decided in accordance with firm’s security attitude. Thus, the heat mastrix is divided into 4 quadrants with 
varying combinations risk-severity values. 
Results and Discussion 
Risk Assessment 
We assess risk by calculating probability of DDoS attack using logit and probit models. Table 3 details the 
coefficients for each type of DDoS attack in both the modelling exercises (eq. 1 and 2). 
 
Table 3: Coefficients of Logit and Probit model for training set (from 2012 to 2016) 
 Logit Model  Probit Model 
 coeff SE t p dev  coeff SE t p dev 
CGA -1.990 0.235 -8.484 0.000 159.863  -1.173 0.135 -8.673 0.000 158.755 
 0.487 0.070 6.931 0.000   0.293 0.042 7.040 0.000  
 0.009 0.010 0.932 0.351   0.004 0.006 0.689 0.491  
DF -0.697 0.194 -3.585 0.000 227.381  -0.448 0.116 -3.852 0.000 227.479 
 -0.119 0.022 -5.305 0.000   -0.070 0.013 -5.297 0.000  
 0.006 0.009 0.660 0.510   0.004 0.006 0.765 0.444  
NF -1.513 0.294 -5.140 0.000 102.663  -0.916 0.174 -5.275 0.000 102.658 
 -0.065 0.027 -2.381 0.017   -0.038 0.016 -2.393 0.000  
 0.031 0.013 2.388 0.017   0.018 0.008 2.377 0.444  
 
Figure 2 illustrates fitted data points (in red) along with actual data points (in blue) where y-axis denotes 
the proportion or probability of occurrence for each attack points in the dataset. 
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Figure 2: Fitted Logit Model Vs Actual Data Points for each attack type 
 
Next, we fit a beta distribution to the probability values given by logit model in the last step. Table 4 details 
the generated parameters of beta distribution, a and b along with mean and standard deviation of the fitted 
distribution (eq. 3). Figure 3 depicts the fitted beta distribution curve for each DDoS attack type. 
 
Figure 3: Fitted Beta distribution curve for probability of DDoS attacks of each type 
 
Table 4: Parameter estimates of beta distribution for probability of each DDoS attack type 
Attack type a b Mean Standard Deviation 
CGA 6.62 24.36 0.21 0.07 
DF 22.73 46.63 0.32 0.05 
NF 19.35 59.80 0.24 0.04 
Loss Computation 
Figure 4 illustrates the curve fitting exercise undertaken to ascertain suitability of gamma distribution for 
approximating losses due to cyber-risks (Mukhopadhyay et al. 2007). Table 5 tabulates parameters of 
gamma distribution α and λ along with mean and standard deviation loss amount for each attack type. Table 
6 records the probability of each attack type and expected loss for the firm because of the DDoS attack. 
 
Figure 4: Fitted Gamma distribution curve for loss occurring in each attack type 
 
Table 5: Parameter estimates of gamma distribution for loss occurring in each DDoS attack type 
Attack type α λ Mean Standard Deviation 
CGA 5.10 1.65 3.08 1.36 
DF 4.81 1.71 2.81 1.28 
NF 6.43 1.41 4.54 1.79 
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Table 6: Risk and Severity Matrix 
Attack 
type 
Risk: Probability of 
DDoS attack (p) 
Severity: Expected loss (in millions of US$) 
E(L) = p * L 
CGA 0.21 0.65 
DF 0.32 0.90 
NF 0.24 1.09 
SF 0.19 3.56 
UFL 0.1 0.18 
UFR 0.5 1.89 
Risk Mitigation 
Figure 5 depicts a heat matrix calculated from the model that situates the different DDoS attacks in terms 
of Risk × Severity. This helps a chief technology officer (CTO) to prioritize the risk mitigation strategy, such 
as technological intervention to reduce the risk or transfer risk through cyber-insurance. For example, a 
DDoS attack of type UFR is in the high risk-high severity quadrant, while attacks NF, DF, CGA, and UFL 
are in the low risk-low severity quadrant. Therefore, the Chief Technology Officer (CTO) of an enterprise at 
risk of DDoS attacks of type UFR should consider implementing the following risk mitigation strategies: 
First, add stringent firewalls or intrusion detection systems or divert excess/illegitimate traffic to backup 
servers/content delivery networks (CDNs) to reduce the risk and thus lower the severity of DDoS attack. 
Next, transfer the residual risk by subscribing to cyber-insurance policies, thus moving into the low risk-
low severity quadrant (Biswas et al. 2017; Das et al. 2019; Kunreuther 1997). 
 
Figure 5: Risk Mitigation Heat Matrix 
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The predictions made in this study are based on historical data, and thus we assume that attackers behave 
a certain way. It is very likely that the pattern of attacks will change in response to firms’ defenses to it. The 
generalizability of the study is limited to online gaming industry. The future research will aim at comparing 
risk mitigation strategies across different industries and temporal analysis of DDoS attacks. Prior security 
investments and DDoS attack vectors can also be studied as antecedents to future attack intensity and 
duration.   
Conclusion 
Our study helps in predicting the probability of DDoS attacks of aforesaid six types occurring in the gaming 
industry. It also helps in quantifying expected loss for each attack type. It helps the CTO in taking informed 
decisions while drafting the security mechanisms according to the risk profile of the firm. It also helps them 
decide whether to accept the cyber-risk or reduce it. If possible, they can pass or avoid the cyber-risk by 
using appropriate technological interventions combined with cyber-insurance. 
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